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The main objective of this study is to examine the role of corporate governance 
variables on emerging financially distress companies in Malaysia. This study has 
selected the sample from listed companies of Main and ACE market using 
classification of Practice Note 4 (PN4) or Practice Note 17 (PN17) and Guidance 
Note (GN3) respectively in Bursa Malaysia. This study also attempted to highlight 
the theories of corporate governance that closely related to the Malaysian listed 
firms. The period of study is 13 years (2001 - 2013). Logistic regressions have been 
conducted and three models have developed to test the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables. The findings show that blockholders 
ownership and number of blockholders have an impact on emerging financially 
distressed companies. This analysis method can be applicable for those companies 
currently facing financial distress situation. Meanwhile, board size shows no 
significant relationship on emerging financially distressed companies as this shows 
that board size doesn’t give an impact on emerging financially distressed companies.    
 








Objektif utama kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji kesan pembolehubah tadbir urus 
korporat terhadap syarikat-syarikat yang mengalami masalah kewangan di Malaysia. 
Kajian ini menggunakan sampel syarikat-syarikat tersenarai Pasaran Utama dan ACE 
menggunakan klasifikasi Nota Amalan 4 (PN4) atau Nota Amalan 17 (PN17) dan Nota 
Panduan (GN3) masing-masing dari Bursa Malaysia. Kajian ini juga mengutarakan 
teori-teori tadbir urus korporat yang berkait rapat dengan syarikat-syarikat yang 
disenaraikan di Malaysia. Tempoh pengajian adalah 13 tahun iaitu dari tahun 2001 
hingga 2013. Analysis logistik telah dijalankan dan tiga model telah dibangunkan untuk 
menguji hubungan antara pembolehubah bebas dan pembolehubah bersandar. 
Penemuan menunjukkan bahawa pemilikan pemegang blok dan bilangan pemegang 
blok mempengaruhi syarikat yang mengalami masalah kewangan. Kaedah analisis ini 
boleh digunakan untuk syarikat-syarikat yang ketika ini sedang mengalami masalah 
kewangan. Sementara itu, saiz lembaga menunjukkan tiada hubungan signifikan 
dengan syarikat yang mengalami masalah kewangan. Sementara itu, saiz lembaga 
menunjukkan tiada hubungan yang signifikan terhadap syarikat-syarikat kewangan 
yang sedang mengalami masalah kewangan kerana saiz lembaga tidak akan memberi 
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1.1 Background of the study  
 
 
Bursa Malaysia define financial distress as companies that are categorized under PN17 
and GN3 under Main and ACE market respectively in Malaysian context (Ismail, 
Ahmad, Kamarudin, & Yahaya, 2005). In other words, corporations that seek for court 
protection from taking any legal custody by their creditors and restructured under the 
Scheme of Arrangement and Reconstruction pursuant to Section 176 (Low, Fauzias, 
and Yatim, 2001; Ong, Yap, and Khong, 2011; Yap, Munuswamy, and Zulkifflee, 
2012). Both PN4 and GN3 have provided various regulations and requirements for 
corporates to obey. Detention order assists financial distress companies from taking 
legal custody by court since they were chased by debts due to high leverage and these 
companies were classified under GN3.  On the other side, plenty of time was given (2 
years) for companies to regularize and restructure if the company listed under PN4 as 
financial distress. Already, the exchange had frequently been attacked for being too 
moderate in its activities, making it impossible to punish organizations that did not fit 
in with posting necessities such as negative investors' assets (Fawzia, Kamaluddina, & 
Sanusib, 2015). 
 
Corporate governance subject has been discussed around the world and it is one of the 
important issues. In 1997, Asian financial crisis occurred due to poor performance of 
corporate governance. Cortez and Penacerrada (2010) documented that both disclosure 
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information on firm performance and firm internal control procedures are able to 
enhance and strengthen the agency theory through corporate guidelines which are 
mutually agreed upon. Mitton (2002) argued that corporate governance protects 
minority shareholders from the confiscation of the power by the manager or controlling 
shareholder. Generally, companies that are in countries with serious governance 
problem and less external protection disappoint individuals to make large investment 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003). Thus, for the sake of country’s growth, corporate 
governance role is significant. Akhtaruddin and Yao (2009) mentioned that to achieve 
the firm’s objective, corporate governance code plays a significant role while also 
pushes the firm to disclose their performance which is a necessary activity, hence 
investors are able to assess the corporate performance. The author also stated that 
Malaysia is not an exception to introduce the corporate governance codes while most 
countries practice the same codes around the world. Effective January 2001, Kuala 
Lumpur stock exchange which currently known as Bursa Malaysia practices the 
Malaysian Code on corporate governance in its listing rules and this code was 
introduced in March 2000.   
 
Malaysian companies’ business is mostly based on family business in which these 
family members serve as executive directors. Agency problem are lessened if the 
business is owned by family members due better monitoring systems. Unclear and 
undefined roles and responsibilities issues might occur in family ownership especially 
between shareholders and managers (Ghee, Ibrahim, & Abdul-Halim, 2015). According 
to Claessens, Djankov and Fan (1999), single shareholder controls about more than 
66% of the firms including Malaysia and nine East Asian countries.  Shareholders 
controlled by family are around more than 50% in companies’ top management. The 
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author also stated that more than 50% of East Asian companies are controlled by 
families. In order to find financial distress due to family ownership in corporate, these 
platforms are really good to conduct study on both financial distress and corporate 
governance.  
 
Malaysia consists of various cultures due to different races in both east and west 
Malaysia. Malaysia companies’ working culture is highly merged with many different 
races and this is usually regulated by Department of Employment (Zawawi, 2008). 
Pettigrew (1979) specified that individuals follow different norms and values even 
though they belong to the same cultural group. This is supported by Cornelius (2005) 
that country culture is one of the important criteria to be considered while examining 
the corporate practices of various nations around the globe. Abdullah (2006) stated that 
dominant roles can be found in both politics and economy by Malays and Chinese 
respectively. Even though majority ethnic group in Malaysia is comprised of Malays, 
the dominant role in economy is played by mostly Chinese (Mamman, 2002). However, 
no empirical findings are available to investigate the correlation of different races and 
corporate governance towards financial distress. 
 
The objective of this this study is to identify the impact of corporate governance on 
emerging financially distressed companies in Malaysia. Companies in Malaysia will be 
able to reach the ideas and prospects of the importance and impact of corporate 






1.2 Research problem 
 
 
This study observes whether financially distressed companies can be emerged by using 
corporate governance variable in Malaysia context. In fact, corporate governance code 
and legal system are different from one country to another to control the financial 
distress, so the characteristics of corporate governance are different in Malaysia.  Issues 
related to accounting scandal and corporate collapse and past issues contribute to the 
failure of corporate governance exercise in a country (Kiel, 2003). According to 
Norwani, Mohamad and Chek (2011), weaknesses of Malaysian corporate governance 
practice is highlighted to the public awareness only after the incident of Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 and boosted up the importance of corporate governance. Asian financial 
crisis leads to improving and restructuring of corporate governance implementation in 
countries especially Malaysia and organizations especially used corporate law as a way 
to improve since 1998 (Teen & Phan, 1999). In 1999, restructuring of High Level 
Financial Committee was initiated by ministry of finance on corporate governance. 
High Level Financial Committee is responsible in improving corporate control weak 
and reviewing the corporate governance framework (Abidin & Ahmad, 2007).  
 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2007 code) highlighted that “board of 
directors, audit committee and the internal audit function” need to be strengthen. This 
code which was issued in March 2000 to restructure corporate governance marked a 
significant milestone in Malaysia.  In 2012, The Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) was revised to ensure energetic and accountable fiduciaries in the 
role of directors by strengthening board structure and composition recognizing are 
focused. Management and boards must not have compromised on the interest of the 
stakeholders, but they must ensure the best interest of the business and investors with 
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their efforts and resources which they must keep in their mind. The Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance role does not limit only to setting strategic direction and 
supervising business performance, in fact they are also required to ensure the business 
maintains an effective governance structure and that they complied with rules and 
values so that the company is able to maintain appropriate risk of management and level 
of internal controls. Financial performance reporting information is the essential factor 
that should be available timely by maintaining the quality and accuracy which is one of 
the main aspects of shareholders protection and market assurance. For informed 
decision making, disclosure and transparency of information are crucial. In Asia 
especially Malaysia, there is not enough of research conducted on corporate governance 
and financial distress. 
 
New Malaysian Code on corporate governance (MCCG 2017) was issued on 26 April 
by the Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) in order to supersede the previous 
Malaysian Code (MCCG 2012) which takes effect immediately. Strengthening business 
culture pillared on accountability and transparency is the main practice to be work out 
with this new sets. The MCCG 2017 is considering fourth version which reviewed in 
2016 by SC based on the previous version (MCCG 2000, 2007 and 2012). MCCG 2017 
was reviewed with focus on changes in market structure and business needs, corporate 
governance improvement as the lesson from Asian Financial crisis and inputs from both 
local and international stakeholders. The new code describes CARE approach which 
stands for comprehend, apply and report in order to ensure good corporate governance 
is practiced by setting out several processes and also ensuring how the corporate has 
applied practices with meaningful and fair description that should be laid out in the 
code. MCCG 2017 stated that companies need to provide alternative actions or steps if 
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they fail to comply with the latest MCCG 2017 requirements and they should bear in 
mind that it is insufficient for companies if their explanations on break rules are unclear. 
These requirements are for all the existing large companies even though these 
companies are not following the practice previously in which they must disclose all the 
actions that have been taken before or intend to take in the future including the time 
frame to be taken for the prescribed practice to be applied. Close guide and 
considerations by the guidance are needed for these companies when they adopt these 
practices (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2017). 
 
Arise of conflict and imbalance between shareholders and agents caused the corporate 
governance failure interrelated with agency theory issues. If   the implementation of 
corporate governance is ineffective and not properly managed, it will caused 
management conflicts between shareholders and management which finally may lead 
to corporate scandal. Improper and ineffective management on the execution of 
corporate governance is the key reason for the agency theory issues to arise which tends 
to affect a business performance and the operations. Overall, companies are able to gain 
investor’s confidence only by providing quality financial reports as the result of best 
corporate governance implementation, and yet, rise of corporate scandal is the sad truth 
due to existing corporate governance failure. According to Norwani, Mohamad and 
Chek (2011), existing corporate governance failure arise from overstatement of both 
financial position and revenue of the company, holding of major shares and high 
position such as chief executive officer by the one person and several misconducts in 
the directorship. Thus, the present study will extend the previous researcher argument 
in order to analyse the role of corporate governance on companies emerging from 
financial distress status. 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To study whether board size will cause a company to emerge from financial distress 
status. 
2. To study whether blockholders ownership will cause a company to emerge from 
financial distress status. 
3. To study whether number of blockholders will cause a company to emerge from 
financial distress status. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
1. Does board size cause a company to emerge from financial distress status? 
2. Does blockholders ownership cause a company to emerge from financial distress 
status? 
3. Does number of blockholders cause a company to emerge from financial distress 
status? 
 
1.5 Significant of the Study  
 
This study examines how corporate governance variables will contribute for a company 
to emerge after or during financial distress. A company’s failure or value editions are 
both dependent on corporate governance practice and implementation. Relationship 
between corporate governance and financial distress in Malaysia’s circumstances is the 
major research question of the study. Therefore, the essential impact towards financial 
distress by corporate governance practices includes board size, blockholders ownership 




Our finding provides better forecasting technique for a company that is currently facing 
the financial distress situation to evaluate whether the company will be emerged or 
delisted in the future. This study mainly focused on financial distress company 
interrelation with corporate governance variables including board size, blockholders 
ownership and number of blockholders. These corporate variables are essential 
elements to predict whether a company can be emerge from financial distress status. 
 
The present study additionally proves that firm-particular attributes could be as helpful 
as deciding the probability of emerging financial distress. In addition, this investigation 
shows that corporate governance rules are connected with bring down organization 
costs, and more grounded firm corporate governance related to financial distress. 
Corporate governance’s effects towards stages before and during financial distress are 
mostly focused by many studies. However, this study will beyond to explore on the key 
part of corporate governance mechanisms on whether a company could be emerged 
from financial distress status. 
 
1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 
 
This study has selected the sample companies from Main and ACE market using 
classification of Practice Note 4 (PN4) or Practice Note 17 (PN17) and Guidance Note 
(GN3) respectively in Bursa Malaysia. The period covered in this study is from year 
2001 until 2013 as consisting of 13 years. Meanwhile, the time frame from 2014 until 
present is considered a period of observation to see the results of research. The total 
number of observations of this study is 233.  
 
The study investigates only Malaysian firms which would condescendingly suggests that 
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the finding or data obtained from this examination just provides the knowledge for 
corporate management to see how precisely the corporate governance factors bring about 
effects. Furthermore, data gathering is crucial in this study as most of the corporate 
governance variables data are not available from some companies’ annual report. 
 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
 
 
This study starts with an introduction to chapter one. This chapter discusses the 
background of the study, research problem, research questions, and objectives, 
significance of the study, scope and limitation of the study. 
 
Chapter two presents the definition of corporate finance and financial distress, previous 
literature related to this study in order to develop a hypothesis for this research. They are 
divided into two sections namely theoretical literature and empirical review for 
independent variables and control variables. 
 
The third chapter concentrates in shaping the research design, research framework, 
hypotheses development, variables selection data and sample collection. The fourth 
chapter discusses in detail about the result and empirical findings. The empirical finding 
is analysed and explained whether a hypothesis is accepted or rejected. 
 
Then, the main conclusion and recommendation which is derived from the analysis of 













The study objective is to study the effect of corporate governance mechanism on 
companies emerging from the financial distress situation in Malaysia. The section 2.2 
and 2.3 presents the definition of corporate governance and financial distress, 2.4 
discussed the theoretical literature on corporate governance and section 2.5 reviews the 
empirical studies on corporate governance and control variables of this study. 
 
2.2 Definition of Corporate Governance 
 
 
According to Keong (2000), refer to the rights of decision making by shareholders in 
boardroom and the role or responsibility of the board of directors in management 
decision.  In fact, this is supported by The High Level Finance Committee Report where 
they defined corporate governance in the same perspective. Soon (2003) stated that “the 
procedure and structure used to coordinate and deal with the business and undertakings 
of the organization towards improving business flourishing and corporate responsibility 
with a definitive goal of acknowledging long term investor value while considering the 
enthusiasm of other stakeholders” is the definition provided by The High Level Finance 
Committee Report. 
 
Different researchers have defined the corporate governance in different ways but in 
the same perspective. In order to maximize the value of firm for the owners, corporate 
governance influences the management teams (controllers that make decision on firm 
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management) in decision making for both market and institution (Dennis and 
McConnell, 2003). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defined corporate governance in 
different words which are ‘Corporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.’ 
 
In simple words, corporate governance can be defined as the procedure and regulations 
to internal controllers (board of directors and managers) who are responsible for their 
"voters" including investors and shareholders. Transparency, fairness and 
trustworthiness are the key mechanisms that should be applied for decision making 
which are also emphasized by corporate governance (Abidin and Ahmad, 2007). 
Ownership and control elements are the key subject emphasized which was expressed 
by Cadbury (1993), Monks and Minow (1995). However, Blair (1995) viewed the 
description of the corporate governance subject in broad perspective that the role of the 
states is significant for the corporate governance implementation in the degree of good 
level.  The author also stated that the interest of stakeholders is in consideration while 
The Malaysian High Level Finance Committee describes corporate governance as key 
mechanism that assists to strengthen quality of corporate accountability and business 
prosperity by directing and managing corporate affairs. In other words, using the law, 
contracts and organizational designs, how companies secure the efficient management 
is an area that is covered by corporate governance.  
 
Corporate governance refers to corporate directors’ role on the implementation of 
objective and strategies of a company by the company directors or managers which was 
broadly explained by Cornelius (2005). The author also stated that corporations, 
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investors and administrations govern their conduct due to the arrangement of the 
interlocking tenets which can be seen in corporate governance. Oman, C. P. (2001) 
characterized corporate governance as a term alludes to the private and open 
establishments that incorporate laws, directions and the business hones which represent 
the connection between the corporate chiefs and the stakeholders. 
 
2.3 Definition of Financial distress 
 
 
When a firm has a condition in which financial obligation is not met or filled with 
difficulty is called financial distress (Wu, Liang, & Yang, 2008). Besides that, Chan 
and Chen (1991) documented financially distressed firms as those having poor 
execution, wasteful producers, and furthermore those liable to have high monetary use 
and income issues because of which firms lose their fairly estimated worth. Share prices 
are more sensitive to economic changes and are less likely to survive in a bad economic 
situation. In other words, it is marginal. Investors prefer premiums to hold risky stocks 
and also expect to be rewarded since they bear the risk. Typically, the financial hardship 
of the above nature is measured by the probability of failure (Shumway, 2001).  
 
Different author has different view on financial distress, thus it can be defined where 
companies that suffer negative cash flow from operating activities, investing activities 
and financing activities (Jantadej 2006), default loan payments due to inadequate cash 
flows (Foster and Ward, 1997), enter into liquidation or consider as bankruptcy (Grice 
and Dugan, 2001) and with the court protection, continues to operate or liquidate 





According to Platt and Platt (2002), financial distress may lead a firm to default on an 
agreement, and it might include budgetary rebuilding between the firm, its creditors, 
and its value shareholders. Normally the firm is compelled to take activities that it 
would not have taken on the off chance that it had adequate income. According to 
Brigham and Daves (2003), financial distress started when the organization can't meet 
the installment plan or when the income projections demonstrate that the organization 
will soon be not able meet its commitments.  
 
2.4  Theoretical Literature 
 
 
After Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, reforming of quality corporate governance 
practice adopted since the crisis has obtained the attention of public regarding how 
weak the practices of the Malaysian corporate governance. However, there are some 
limitations for agencies such as Ministry of Finance, Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE), Securities Commission (SC) and Registrar of Company that are directly 
involved in corporate governance implementation. MCCG 2000 especially has 
influenced companies positively for corporate governance practice where MCCG 2000 
is one of the essential tools for restructuring of Malaysian corporate governance. The 
2007 and 2012 Malaysian Corporate Code on Corporate Governance is reviewed to 
ensure the standard and global practices to remain relevant and aligned with current 
application. 
 
For the sake of accountability and transparency by the reinforcement of quality practice 
of corporate management, Malaysia SC supersedes the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) on 26 April 2017. This code does not only apply for listing firm, 
but it also required to be practiced by non-listed firm including small and medium 
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enterprises (SME), state-owner enterprises and other licensed entities for the greater 
emphasis on the internalization of corporate governance culture. 
  
Corporate governance and agency theory endeavors to explain connection between the 
shareholders or principles and agents such as directors. Therefore, it is believed that 
corporate governance study initially arose from agency theory. It delegates an agent to 
perform work or the shareholders hires is explained in agency theory. One party acts 
for the benefit of the other party based on the relationship of agency theory and 
corporate governance (Saltaji, 2013).  According to Weisbach (1998) and Warner 
(1977), the interest of both principal and agents are not really aligned which caused 
difficulty according to classical agency theory. For instance, the owners of the company 
are able to act in two roles which are hiring employees for the various task performances 
and also being shareholders. Poor performance by directors in a company leads to high 
probability of losing their employments according to the most reliable empirical results 
regardless of the data examined. It will take a prolonged time to find out the director’s 
poor performance in a company which results in forced top executive turnover or loss 
of job. In consistence with this statement, Gilson (1989), Kalpan and Reishus (1990) 
finds that remuneration level for corporate directors and past performance in defining 
job opportunities and this evidence was obtained from the external labor market. Since, 
there is poor managers’ performance that has cut dividends and was less likely to be 
recruited by other companies for the outside managers’ role.  
 
2.5 Empirical Evidence: Corporate governance and control variables 
 
 
Major corporate governance variables include board size, blockholders ownership and 
number of blockholders while control variables containing financial variables and 
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market variable. Financial variables such as total assets, total assets turnover, EBIT to 
interest expense ratio and leverage while market variable is Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns. 
2.5.1 Board size  
 
 
Number of individuals who serve in a company board is referred as board size. The 
quality of monitoring and guidance are interrelated with the number of board or board’s 
size. More voluntary exposure is found in the large board size according to Htay and 
Meera (2012) which is also supported by Abeysekera (2010) who claimed that better 
voluntary disclosures and proper communication with investors can be assured by large 
number of board members. Meanwhile, Schiehll, Tera and Victor (2013) study shows 
that in Brazilian organizations, a study expressed that the degree of voluntary disclosure 
has fundamental relation with the board size and the presence of compensation 
committee. However, when the board of size increases or grows, the management 
control will be decreased which leads to less effectiveness in monitoring (Jensen, 1983). 
This is supported by Vafeas (2000) as the management will be more effective in 
monitoring when the responsibilities are handled by small number of board directors. 
 
According to Jensen (1993), stated that ineffective management can be found when the 
boards consist of more than seven or eight members. He also added that ineffective 
management can be found from poor communication, coordination and decision 
making when there are larger board directors. Negative relationship is found between 
board size and corporate value based on empirical studies on board size (Sunday, 2008).  
Therefore, practical discussions of important issues for the management control 
between board members are less effective. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that it is 
easier for CEO to control the management with the smallest board size or else 
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challenges and problems arise when a board size gets large and difficult to develop and 
organize. Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) study also supported 
to this issue, whereby Yermack (1996) obtained negative correlation between board 
size and financial gain in Finland, while Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) attained 
positive correlation between corporate performance and small size board. The author 
also stated that better monitoring and better-informed board members about earnings 
can be done with a minimum of five board directors. Mak   and   Yuanto   (2003)  shared 
the same idea that better corporate performance in both Malaysia and Singapore can be 
found due to five board directors being in charge of the management control. 
2.5.2 Blockholders ownership 
 
 
According to Barclay and Holderness (1992), Shareholders or investors who hold at 
least 5% of company common shares are called blockholders. The author also argued 
that fluctuation of share price depends on acquisitions of large share blocks, when it 
comes to increase in price, usually lesser than the premium is paid by the acquirer of 
the stock (demonstrating the actuality of some private benefits of control to the 
blockholders). 
 
Owning of share by blockholders over a specific level may prompt entrenchment of 
owner-managers that seize the wealth of minority investors (Fama and Jensen 1983; 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The ownership portfolio 
risk will increment with their presentation, which may impact both risk taking and 
expected returns. 
 
A negative effect of firm size (market value) on ownership concentration was proposed 
and supported by Demsetz (1995). For instance, when the firm share price is high, 
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shareholders tries to sell the share which tends to drop the negative feedback by 
blockholders ownership. Additionally, positive relation expected only may occur if 
blockholders decided to stay in control, as higher market prices allow a certain level of 
investment issuing a smaller measure of stock to outside owners (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000). Thus it is believed that, there is positive and 
negative relationship between blockholders ownership and firm value. So, it is inferred 
that high value companies’ shares held by incumbent owners in big portions or fractions 
have positive effect of firm value towards share portion that was held by incumbent 
shareholders. 
 
Quality management control can be provide by those large shareholders who has similar 
thoughts as outside investors, whilst the larger ownership has negative relationship on 
corporate governance (negative impact on corporate performance). However, thoughts 
can be diverged between large blockholders and outside investors. On the other side, to 
get large profit or incentive from the shares, those large blockholders would attempt to 
monitor manager effectively (Meckling and Jensen, 1976). 
 
Stiglitz (1985) argued that, large blockholders may use their authorization negatively 
where they can control at the expense of minority shareholders. Expense of the minor 
shareholders can better off at the expense since they have strong incentive in order to 
divert resources regardless of the identity of large blockholders (Wruck, 1989). 
Minority investors are afraid of acquisitions by managers and their owners who are 
causing difficulties in increasing equity financing as suggested by La Porta R (1998) 




In fact, all these issues (fundamental agency problem) are due to conflicts between large 
blockholders who has control over managers and outside investors (minority 
shareholders) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As a matter of fact, with the intention of 
extracting control premiums at the expense of other shareholders, large blockholders 
will abuse their power in the view of entrepreneurs. This can negatively affect the firm's 
value and may prevent investors from investing. 
2.5.3 Number of blockholders 
 
 
Firm value improves due to liquidity particularly in firms with multiple blockholders 
as documented by Bharath, Jayaraman and Nagar (2010) while Smith and Swan (2008) 
study shows that trading by multiple blockholders disciplines managerial 
compensation. Increase in the number of blockholders leads to improve company 
performance, price efficiency augments, and reduces trading profits (David, Gardner, 
& Swan, 2010). Boehmer and Kelley (2009) viewed that ownership dispersion is in 
increased while the price instructive in number of blockholders is increasing (Gorton, 
Huang, & Kang, 2010).  
 
Using total institutional ownership or the holding of the largest shareholder is provided 
by corporate governance, however the number of blockholders is a key driver for 
market efficiency and significant variable in corporate governance (Gorton, Huang, and 
Kang, 2010). 
 
Financial market and firm value has impact from number of blockholders and its help 
to predicts that a more prominent number of blockholders decreases total trading 
incomes, however builds price effectiveness. Multiple blockholders can enhance the 
value of firm, as opposed to existing models that advocate a single concentrated 
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blockholders. The impact of the number of blockholders on costs and firm value 
recommends that it is a critical determinant of both market proficiency and corporate 
governance (Gallagher, Gardner and Swan, 2010).  
2.5.4 Total assets 
 
 
Firm size (the size of the company) illustrates the size of the total assets owned by a 
company. The bigger the company access to funds will be more easily so that the agency 
costs will be even greater.  This is supported by Ehikioya (2009), who also mentioned 
that firm size can be measured by total assets. Therefore, total assets are good 
representation of how large or small a firm in size. Things that can be classified under 
assets are land, equipment, receivables and so on whichever owned or will be owned 
by owners themselves. Financial distress likelihood is faced by small size firm 
compared to large size firm as mentioned by Altman (1968). According to Elloumi and 
Gueyié (2001), it was shown that, large firms have the ability to bear the shock of 
economic environment since they have good management skills as the reason for less 
probability in defaulting. However, they face some difficulties as well since they have 
a large board which leads to monitoring issues and also difficulties to control 
subsidiaries that were opened in different countries. Therefore, financial distress affects 
less for larger firm, hence the size of company has positive relation with financial 
performance (Elloumi and Gueyié, 2001). 
2.5.5 Total Assets Turnover 
 
 
Total assets turnover referring to how firm generate the income by efficiently utilize 
the total assets. The higher turnover of the assets representing the more proficient the 
company will be regarded to be in the usage of resources for generate profit (Okwuosa, 
2005).  Osisioma (2000) examine expressed that total asset turnover proportion 
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estimates the productivity of the utilization of the capital put resources into the benefits 
by relating the volume of offers to the total asset utilized in the business. The bigger the 
estimation of profit (contributed capital), the bigger will be the sales on put resources 
into the benefits of the business. The author additionally said that the proportion have 
an expansive proportion of the productivity of the utilization of capital, since the total 
asset incorporate plant and other long term asset (fixed asset) and current asset as well. 
It assist management to decide whether the business volume is adequate, in respect to 
the capital duty in the business. 
2.5.6 EBIT to Interest expense ratio 
 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) study stated that, interest coverage ratio can be measured by 
both earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to interest expense and earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to interest expense. To ensure 
that the firm is focused, the former proxy only fits if the investment is as large as the 
depreciation is required although both ratios are used in Rajan and Zingaless (1995) 
models. If such investment is not needed, the better measure of the firm's ability to pay 
the debt is EBITDA at fixed interest costs. A typical issue for the two measures is that 
they accept that short-term liabilities like accounts payable and less than 1 year 
obligation will be moved over, which may not be valid in the midst of distress. 
Moreover, as Jensen (1986) argues, an inability to make fixed payments at low levels 
of obligation may have altogether different ramifications for the control of firm than a 
failure to make those payments at high levels of obligation. The previous will probably 
prompt liquidation while the last may prompt redesign (particularly if the obligation is 







Total debt divided with total assets refers to leverage ratio which tends to measure 
company financial risk. Khalifa, White, and El Sayed, (2007) expressed that the 
empirical finding shows negative relation between leverage and financial distress risk. 
On the other hand, positive relations were found between leverage and financial distress 
(Parker, Peters, and Turetsky, 2002).  Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen (2008) considered the 
impact of firm-particular factors in in leverage decisions into account and led an overall 
review to explore the leverage determinants.  They also found that nation particular 
factors as leaser right protection, impose rate, bond market development and GDP 
development rate which has impact on corporate capital structure. Besides, there is a 
distinction in the greatness of firm-particular variables affecting leverage decision in 
various nations, for example, firm development and productivity. At long last, in 
nations with a superior lawful condition and generally steadier and more beneficial 




Return on Assets (ROA), a measures the general adequacy of management in producing 
returns to ordinary investors with its accessible resources. Return on Assets (ROA) is 
positive indicates that of the total assets used to work to generate income to the 
organization. Alternately, when a negative profit for resources demonstrates that the 
utilization of total assets, the organization endured a loss. So that if an organization has 
a high ROA are sure then the organization has an awesome chance to improve the 
development of their own capital.  on the other hand, if the total assets utilized by the 
organization are not influencing a benefit it to will hinder the development of their own 
capital. Nonetheless, Uchida (2006) study stated that the ROA has positive and huge 
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effect on Tobin's Q. Whereas, Ulupui (2007) study discovered outcomes that ROA huge 
beneficial outcome on stock returns one period ahead. Subsequently, ROA is one of the 
components that influence firm performance. Carlson and Bathala (1997) likewise 
found that ROA constructive outcome on firm value. But, the distinctive outcomes 
acquired by Suranta and Pratana (2004) as the study found that ROA negatively 
influence the value of the organization. 
2.5.8 Current Ratio 
 
 
Eljelly, A (2004) documented that current ratio and cash gap (cash conversion cycle) 
on a sample of joint stock companies in Saudi Arabia using correlation and regression 
analysis estimated the connection between profitability and liquidity. This author found 
a negative connection amongst profitability and liquidity pointers, and it was 
discovered that money transformation cycle had a greater effect over productivity then 
Current ratio. Likewise it was seen that there was awesome variety among businesses 
as for the huge proportion of liquidity. 
 
The most widely recognized proportion of liquidity is present proportion and 
quantifiable profit for benefit. A higher current ratio demonstrates a bigger interest in 
current resources which implies, a low rate of rate of profitability for the firm, as 
abundance interest in current resources won't yield enough return. A low current ratio 
implies littler interest in current resources which implies a high rate of degree of 
profitability for the firm, as no unused venture is tied up in current resources (Vishnani 
& Bhupesh, 2007).  
 
The lower the current ratio, the higher the probability will be for company to be 
financially distressed and face difficulty to meet the obligations when level of liquidity 
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is less than one (Ross, Randolph, and Jeffrey, 2005). Likelihood of company failure 
depends on the poor liquidity as indicated by ratios (Parker, Peters, and Turetsky, 2002). 
2.5.9 Cumulative abnormal return 
 
According to Fama and French (1993), Shareholders have greater facility in access to 
data of extensive size firms and so can mirror their desires for the future in the 
organizations' fairly estimated worth. Subsequently, market gearing might be more 
exact to clarify large-firms abnormal returns than to little size-ones (Fama & French, 
1993).  
 
Extant literature on the market reaction to dividend initiation announcement shows that 
earning changes could affect investors’ behavior towards firms’ dividend initiation 
news.  This is supported by Schultz (2004) and Jin (2000) who documented that the 
variable Earning Changes could decide shareholders response to profit inception 
declaration leading to abnormal. Earning Changes has double arguments. On one hand, 
Jin (2000) contended that it is contrarily identified with cumulative abnormal returns 
and this outcome was supported by Schultz (2004). Then again, Jin (2000) inspired 
proof to demonstrate that if shareholders are informed of the company's sure profit, they 
will probably respond unequivocally by buying more stocks whenever the firm reports 
profit inception. 
 
Another study by Garlapi and Yan (2011) stated that cumulative abnormal returns can 
be justified by the existence of financial risk due to debt intensity.  The author added 
that family firms are more unsafe to shareholders because of their characteristics. 











This chapter focused on the methodology and the methods on how the research project 
was carried out. It focuses on data collection and the different approaches used to obtain 
the data. This chapter is divided into six subsections which comprise of research 
framework, hypothesis development, research design, variables used, data collection 
and sampling. 
 
3.2 Research framework 
 
 



















1. Board size 
2. Blockholders ownership 
3. Number of blockholders Dummy variables as 
dependent variables 
 
1 = Emerged/Relisted firm 
0 = Delisted firm 
Control variables 
1. Total assets 
2. Total assets turnover 
3. EBIT to Interest expense 
ratio 
4. Return on assets 
5. Leverage 




3.3 Hypotheses development 
 
 
The hypotheses developed for this study are according to the research question and 
research objectives as discussed in Chapter 1. Three hypotheses have been developed 
for this study. 
3.3.1 Board size 
 
 
The problem of delegation will take place when there is a large board and oversight 
over the CEO is not efficient and there is also an opportunity to act as an unrelenting 
individual. Whereas the second theoretical literature says that advantages, ideas, 
proposals and benefits can be expected by having a smaller board. Actually, a small 
board can be managed by the Chief Executive Officer easily and vice versa (Mokarami 
& Motefares, 2013). Pearce and Zahra (1992) and Pfeffer (1972) mentioned in contrast, 
advantages such as facilitating access to resources and information held by directors, 
larger boards are appropriate where they also help to achieve the company's objectivity.  
Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded that the relationship between size 
of the board and business performance would have negative relationship on emerging 
financial distress. 
H1: Board size is expected to have significant negative impact on emerging 
financially distressed companies. 
 
3.3.2 Blockholders ownership 
 
 
In spite of the fact that there is an assumption in the writing that large investors (holding 
large number of shares) have more noteworthy power and more grounded motivating 
forces to guarantee investor esteem amplification (the incentive alignment theory) the 
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hypothetical connection between interest of ambiguous firm and large owners (Jensen, 
and Meckling 1976; Zeckhauser, and Pound 1990; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997). 
Owning of share by blockholders over a specific level may prompt entrenchment of 
owner-managers that seizes the wealth of minority investors (Fama, and Jensen 1983; 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; Shleifer, and Vishny 1997). Risk taking and 
expected returns will be impacted when the ownership portfolio risk increases with their 
exposure. 
 
In certain countries, blockholders ownership has positive effect on firm value since they 
focus on managerial agency problem and having lower levels of investor protection 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta R 1998). The perseverance hypothesis was 
developed by Bebchuck and Roe (1999) to explain that, market-based structures 
maximized the firm's financial value, however the controlling shareholder structure did 
not automatically develop into an ineffective structure. Personal benefits exist for 
controlling shareholders (Bebchuck and Roe, 1999). Companies must share with 
minority investors the benefits gained by selling more shares to the public which 
reduces the incentives to surrender private controls when firms adopt mixed ownership 
structures (Bebchuck and Roe, 1999). Therefore, the proposed hypothesis is as follows:  
H2: Blockholders ownership is expected to have significant positive impact on 
emerging financially distressed companies. 
 
3.3.3 Number of blockholders 
 
 
There are generally few existing theories regarding multiple large shareholders. 
Zwiebel (1995) demonstrates that various blockholdings can arise when investors 
compete for the private advantages of control by framing alliances. The last 
27 
 
shareholding structure speaks to the result of a power battle as opposed to proficiency, 
while in the paper the quantity of blockholders is ideally boosted firm performance.
  
 
However, managers monitoring actions will be reduced due to large number of 
blockholders existence since vigilant responsibilities are diluted among a greater 
number of dominant shareholders. This results in the managers starting to show self-
serving behavior due to discretion enhancement and low risk strategies that might be 
pursued by managers and trying to avoid risky projects. (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).  
The hypothesis would be as the following:  
H3: Number of blockholders is expected to have significant positive impact on 
emerging financially distressed companies. 
 
 
3.4 Research Design  
 
  
This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and 




















Selected listed Malaysian 
companies 
1. Pearson Correlation 
Analysis 
2. Descriptive Statistics 





3.5.1 Dependent variables 
 
For the dependent variable, dummy variable was used for this study. It is 
coded as 1 for emerged or relisted firm and 0 for delisted firm. 
3.5.2 Independent Variables 
 
Board size  
Number of individuals who serve in a company board is referred as board size.  
 
Blockholders ownership  
Blockholders ownership is the owner of a large block of a company's shares 
and/or bonds and have the power of the voting rights in a company. 
 
Number of blockholders  
The number of shareholders who holds more that 5% ownership shares of a 
company. 
3.5.3 Control variables   
 
Total assets  
Total assets refers to the total amount of assets owned by an individual or entity. 
Total assets measured by sum of all current and noncurrent assets and must 
equal the sum of total liabilities and stockholders' equity combined. 
 
Total assets turnover    
The total asset turnover ratio indicates the efficiency of the company’s usage of 
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its total asset base (net assets equal’s gross assets minus depreciation on fixed 
assets). 
 
EBIT to Interest expense ratio 
EBIT to Interest Expense is a measurement of how much a company is earning 
(EBIT) over its interest payments. A ratio of five means that a company is 
making five times its interest payment expense. 
 
Leverage 
Leverage ratio is used to decide the relative level of obligation stack that a 
business has brought about. These ratios contrast the total obligation 
commitment with either the assets or equity of a business. A high ratio shows 
that a business may have brought about a larger amount of obligation than it 




Return on asset, is a fundamental measure of company profitability, reflecting 
how efficiently and resourcefully its assets are used. Obviously, the greater the 
net income for a given amount of assets, the better the return. 
 
Current Ratio 
This ratio measures the ability of the firm to pay off its current liabilities by 
liquidating its current assets (that is turning them into cash).  It indicates the 
firm’s ability to avoid insolvency in the short period. 
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Cumulative abnormal return 
An abnormal return is the difference between the expected return and the actual 
return of a stock. A cumulative abnormal return is the sum of the abnormal 
returns.  
3.6  Data 
 
 
This study collected the secondary data from Bursa Malaysia website, 
DataStream and also firm’s annual reports. All firm specific factors data such 
as leverage, current ratio, return on assets, total assets, total assets turnover, 
EBIT to Interest expense ratio are extracted from the DataStream database 
while data on corporate governance variables are extracted from firms’ annual 
reports. The empirical analysis covers period from year 2001 until 2013. This 
study performed statistical analysis by using Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) to test the hypotheses. The SPSS had performed descriptive 
statistical analysis, correlation test, and regression analysis. 
 
Table 3.1 










Dummy variable  
(1 = Emerged; 0 = Delisted) 
Companies announcement 




Total number of directors on the board 
 





% of shares held by shareholders owning 5% or 
more 
 





owner of a large block of a company's shares 
and/or bonds 
 











This study performed statistical analysis by using Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) to test the hypotheses. The SPSS had performed 




The objective of this study is to examine the corporate governance variables 
impact towards financially emerging companies in Malaysia. The data are 
collected from year 2001 until 2013. The summary of final sample is shown in 
Table 3.2. Industries such as financial institution, real estate and insurance 
companies are excluded from this present study, due to the reason of the 
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EBIT to Interest 
expense ratio 











Sectors Number of firms 
Construction 24 
Consumer Products 26 
Hotels 3 
Industrial Products 68 



















This chapter presents the empirical results of the study. In the first section, a 
summary of descriptive statistics for the ten variables have been presented. Second 
section discusses the Pearson correlation analysis and followed by the regression 
analysis between dependent and independent variables.  
 
4.2  Descriptive statistics 
 
 
The analysis of descriptive statistics is important for us to understand the basic 
characteristics of the data. Table 4.1 below shows the results of all variables from 
descriptive statistics in the term of mean, median, maximum value, minimum value and 
standard deviation (s.d.). There are a total of 232 companies that have been chosen to 
analyze cumulative abnormal return as the average is about -0.2261 together with a 
standard deviation of about -0.2523. This negative return is due to poor management or 
factors beyond its control, struggles during the period of investment. The mean value of 
total assets is 349772.26 whereas standard deviation is 564054.317.  Moreover, the mean 
value of the total assets turnover is 0.52 which is less than 1. This is mainly due to different 
industry companies have been chosen as samples for the analysis. Furthermore, the low 
turnover may also mean that the companies might have unsystematic collection methods. 
The collection period of debts from receivables might be too long, prompting a higher 
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records receivable. Target could likewise not utilize its advantages proficiently. For 
instance, several assets such as equipment or land are not being utilized to their full capacity 
or could be sitting idle. Mean value of ROA is -17.27 with -164 and 58 of minimum and 
maximum value respectively. It indicates that on average, the firms have return on their 
assets at -17.27. 
 
The mean value of EBIT to expense ratio is 1.99 which obviously specified that the 
companies selected are in a better position to settle both its obligations and liabilities. This 
also indicates that on average, the companies have enough cash to pay off their expenses 
within a timeframe. Apart from that, leverage ratio shows the average value of around 
64.20. As we investigate, the highest debt ratio achieves 565 values. This firm may be more 
dependent on the debt financing for capital structure. On the other hand, the lowest value 
leverage ratio is 0, in which states that this firm is mostly equity financing rather than debt 
financing for their capital structure. The current ratio ranges from 0 to 11. Theoretically, 
liquidity position of organizations will be weak if the current ratio is lower than 1. This 
does not mean that excess amount of cash or inventory lead to greater liquidity position for 
a company when the current ratio shows greater than 1. Prominently, the mean of current 
ratio is about 0.82 which specifies a poor or weak liquidity position for most of the selected 
companies on average. 
 
Alnaif (2014) and Yasser, Harry and Mansor (2011) stated the mean value for board size 
in Arabian Banks and Pakistan firms are about 9.76 and 9.3 respectively based on their 
empirical finding. These values are consistent with Jordanian Corporate Governance Codes 
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since they recommend the appropriate board size to be from 5 to 13 members. The above 
result for the average value of board size shows 6 as supported by previous studies and 
Jordanian corporate codes. The minimum value of 3 is due to small scale company which 
is run by family members. Both number of blockholders and blockholders ownership has 
mean value 2.82 and 0.3446 respectively. This means both variables have significant 





Variables N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
CAR -1,+1 232 -1.28 0.38 -0.23 -0.25 
Total Assets 195 3211.00 3930666.00 349772.26 564054.32 
Total Assets Turnover 195 0.00 9.00 0.52 0.88 
EBIT to Interest 
expense ratio 
193 -674.00 2470.00 1.99 185.49 
LEV 194 0.00 565.00 64.20 61.76 
ROA 177 -164.00 58.00 -17.27 29.93 
Current  Ratio 186 0.00 11.00 0.81 1.09 
Board Size 228 3.00 13.00 6.29 1.66 
Blockholders 
ownership 
196 0.05 0.95 0.34 0.17 
Number of 
blockholders 
197 1.00 19.00 2.82 1.90 
 
4.3  Pearson Correlation analysis 
 
Table 4.2 shows the correlation matrix among the explanatory variables. 
Correlation test is conducted to determine the dependent variable association 
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towards the independent variables. The low connections found between the 
illustrative factors demonstrate that the issue of multi-collinearity irrelevance in 
the informational collection. Since the outcome displayed in Table 4.1 
demonstrated that most cross connection terms for the informative factors are 
genuinely little, subsequently showing no reason to worry about the issue of multi-
collinearity among the illustrative factors. 
Besides deciding the presence of the bivariate relationship between factors, 
connection grids additionally receive as to guarantee the connection esteems 
among factors are not very high keeping in mind the end goal is to confine the 
presence of a multi-collinearity issue. 
Based on analysis, Total assets turnover has negative correlation with total assets 
at 1% significant level and number of blockholders is positively significant 
correlation with total assets at 1%. While ROA is positively significant at 5%. For 
EBIT to interest expense ratio show a significantly positive correlation with ROA 
at 1 % significant level but negative correlation with current ratio 5% significant 
level. There is no significant correlation between the corporate governance 
variables. 
 
LEV measured by total debt ratio which is show a significantly negative correlation 
with ROA and current ratio variables at 1% significant level, however ROA 
variable is positively significant at 5% with current ratio and board size variables. 
Furthermore, the corporate governance variable, blockholders ownership shows 





































CAR -1,+1 1 
         
TOTAL ASSETS 0.069 1 










0.024 -0.036 -0.036 1 
      
LEV 0.093 -0.066 0.107 -0.051 1 
     
ROA 0.058 0.179* -0.027 0.225** -0.356** 1 
    
CURRENT RATIO 0.026 0.070 -0.006 -0.181* -0.321** 0.192* 1 
   










0.004 0.357** -0.073 0.011 0.046 0.048 0.034 0.050 0.451** 1 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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4.4  Logistic Regression Analysis 
  
 
Table 4.3 explains about the models have been developed for this study. Model 1 
is analysis of the financial variables as all the variables are negatively insignificant 
except for ROA. Based on the analysis, the result of ROA shows 0.026 which is 
positively significant and it is statistically significant at 5% level. Overall, the 
classification result of financial variables is 64.2. Return on Assets is one of the 
measures of firm performance which has no relation to the corporate governance as 
stated in few studies. However, Ahmed and Hamdan (2015) study (impact of 
corporate governance on firm performance) proved that ROA is interrelated to the 
corporate governance since the result shows significant correlation to the firm 
performance. This study is conducted in Bahrain with the sample of 42 companies 
from 2007 to 2011. Adhering to corporate governance by managers and owners has 
the probability to decrease the agency conflict as well as strengthen company 
performance. Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), and better Tobin's 
Q can be found in better governed United States (U.S) firms (Brown and Caylor, 
2009). Whilst Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005) expressed different opinion that 
firm performance does not depend on better governance and there is no universal 
evidence to propose.  
 
Model 2 is a combination of financial and market variables. The additional market 
variable is cumulative abnormal return as it portrays the estimation of a speculation. 
In particular, it depicts the connection between the normal estimation of a stock 
given the execution of the market all in all and the stock's actual value. According 
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to the estimation results, when the CAR variable combines with other financial 
variables, the result shows that both ROA and CAR variables show positive 
significant level at 5%. The classification result for this model is 63.80% which is 
lower than other models. 
 
Lastly, Model 3 provides the analysis result of financial variables, market and 
governance variables. Board size, Blockholders ownership and number of 
blockholders are the three governance variables that have been added to test the 
significant levels whether they are positive or negative with other variables. The 
model correctly classified 73.9% of overall cases or also known as the percentage 
accuracy in classification which is higher than other models when the analysis 
included all the variables that has been used in the model. The classification table 
is shown in Table 4.4. 
 
The result shows that board size is no significant and CAR variable, blockholders 
ownership and numbers of blockholders variables are positively significant at 1%. 
For financial variables such as Total assets and ROA, they are positively significant 
at 5%. This  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  big  firms  have higher changes 
to emerge in the future  than  small  firms  since they  make  use  of  the  scale  
economy. According to Rothschild (2006), ROA incorporates both net income and 
firms’ assets into its computation and is therefore the premier metric in evaluating 
the performance of management.   The author also examined the role of economic 
cycle on small firm’s performance. Using ROA as the performance measure, they 
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found that small firms perform better than large firms during good economic 
conditions. When the economic condition is weak, however, small firms tend to 
have poor performance and high financial distress risk. This is more than likely 
because small firms tend to have lower ROA and higher leverage in comparison to 
large firms (Chan and Chen, 1988). Another study found that ROA used to respond 
with outside investors as an indication of information about the future cash  because  
ROA  is  obtained  from  the  net  profit  after  tax  is  used  as  the  basis  for  
calculating  net  cash  flow. Performance of the company will be seen as a barometer 
of the  company's  success  in  implementing  a  policy  that  has  been  taken.  As 
a result, if the performance is good, evidenced by  the  large  ROA,  it  will responds  
with  an  outside  investor  to   invest  in  the  company.  This could drive the 
company's stock market value and company growth by increasing the company’s 
stock market price (Dodd and Chen, 1996).  
 
The CAR value shows positive significant at 1% which demonstrating that the 
market able to identify on which company will be survive in the future by emerging 
from financial distress status. Performance of stocks of these distressed companies 
close to announcements is a matter of concern to the investors. Past studies on 
market reaction to bankruptcy filings are well documented in empirical studies 
(Beneith and Press, 1995, Dawkins and Bamber, 1998, and Lang and Stulz, 1992). 
Major negative CAR surrounding the days of financial distress announcement was 
detected, as it is reflected as a bad news. The weakening of price is associated with 
the investor’s prior assessment of the firm’s likelihood of financial distress. The 
41 
 
extent of the reaction could be because of the expected resolution of bankruptcy 
and recovery in the event of financial distress (Beneith and Press, 1995, Chen and 
Church, 1996, Kennedy and Shaw, 1991, and Rose-Green and Dawkins, 2000). 
Therefore, market participants may probably perceive upshots as important, 
possibly causing different reactions by investors. Thus, if a market is efficient, it 
will be able to distinguish between failing companies which are capable of 
restructuring and resuming business (good news) and those that have failed. These 
different outcomes carry different values for the shareholders, and the market may 
have a certain insight or foresight into companies’ future prospects, which may 
cause different stock price reactions. 
 
Both blockholders ownership and number of blockholders variables have positive 
significant at 1%. This result shows that blockholders ownership and number of 
blockholders has the power to influence the performance of the company and 
ownership concentration encourages innovative strategies that help maximize 
value. Thus, if blockholders remain in control with strong preferences, it can bring 
positive feedback effect from firm value to blockholders ownership since a higher 
market makes it conceivable to finance a given level of investment by issuing a low 
amount of stock to outside owners.  (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 2000).  Positive effect from firm value to blockholders ownership occurred 
when those share owners who hold large portion of the share especially in high-
value organizations. By issuing fewer shares while relying more on debt and 
internally generated funds, blockholders and managers able to finance certain 
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investment levels with high stock price and value of the firms.  
 
Market-based systems are typically considered to have possession rights by other 
institutional financial shareholders, people and other minority speculators. In 
comparison, European continental control-based system is portrayed as having 
higher blockholders ownership by establishing families, corporate shareholding 
and governments and less fluid securities exchanges. Certain countries provides 
lower protection for investors since these countries focus on agency problem which 
lead to some positive impacts on blockholders ownerships (Shleifer and Vishny, 




















(Financial variables, market 
and governance variables) 
 
 
 B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig. 
Total Assets 0 0 0.386 0 0 0.43 0.000 0.000 0.044* 
Total Assets Turnover -0.254 0.238 0.286 -0.232 0.254 0.36 0.035 0.304 0.908 
EBIT to Interest expense ratio -0.004 0.005 0.444 -0.003 0.005 0.52 -0.002 0.004 0.669 
LEV 0 0.003 0.959 -0.001 0.003 0.76 0.002 0.004 0.603 
ROA 0.018 0.008 0.026* 0.018 0.008 0.03* 0.024 0.011 0.024* 
Current  Ratio -0.076 0.257 0.768 -0.126 0.262 0.63 -0.035 0.294 0.904 
CAR -1,+1       1.626 0.722 0.02* 2.608 0.954 0.006** 
Board Size             0.013 0.131 0.92 
Blockholders ownership             4.841 1.483 0.001** 
Number of blockholders             -0.343 0.135 0.011** 
 
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
















1 64.20 Financial variables 
2 64.80 Financial variables and market variable 






Summarize of the data explanation has been describe under descriptive analysis 
which represent the entire or a sample of a listed financial distress companies in Bursa 
Malaysia. Approximately, 233 listed companies has been chosen as sample size, 
however not all variables details are available for certain companies. Whilst, Pearson 
correlation analysis measures connection between two variables and followed by 
three models has been developed under regression analysis to test significant 























This chapter concludes the overall study and it consists of three sections. Section 5.2 
discussed summary of the study while section 5.3 outlines the limitations of the study. 
Lastly, Section 5.4 provides the recommendation for future research. 
 
 
5.2 Summary of the study 
 
This study explores the link between corporate governance variables on emerging 
financially distressed companies by choosing 233 Malaysian listed firms over 13 
years period, 2001 to 2013. This study does not focus on any specific sector as various 
sectors have been selected from bursa main and ACE market. This study attempts to 
develop its own models by variables to do the comparison and test the significant 
factor. 
 
The main hypothesis of the study is to identify any significant relationship of 
corporate governance variables on emerging financially distressed companies. In line 
with this hypothesis, the result shows a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between financial distress and blockholders ownership and number of 
blockholders.  The result is also consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) as their study 
found that large shareholders have greater power and stronger incentives to ensure 
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shareholder value maximization. 
 
This study also includes other variables such as size (total assets), total assets 
turnover, EBIT to interest expense ratio, LEV, ROA, Current Ratio in order to explore 
how these financial variables influence corporate variables on emerging financially 
distressed companies. This study also included market variable CAR to test the 
impact on the emerging financially distressed companies. 
 
Total asset turnover is not significant based on regression analysis due to company 
assets to generate revenue might be diverse for each company. Based on Pearson 
correlation analysis, EBIT to interest expense ratio show a significantly positively 
correlated with ROA, whilst negatively correlated with current ratio.  
 
Furthermore, the results also show that blockholders ownership and number of 
blockholders have a positive significance on emerging financially distressed 
companies but no relationship with board size. Blockholders ownership and the 
number of blockholders are ubiquitous as indicated. For all intents and purposes of 
each partnership, of each size in each nation, has them. It is difficult to envision how 
firms could get by in a market economy without huge investors. Blockholders can be 
managed through exit (to describe the blockholders influence on managerial decisions 
through the trading), not simply through voice (splitting a block reduces the 
effectiveness of direct intervention). This new way of blockholders approaches as 
informed traders, rather than just as controlling entities suggests new directions for 
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both theoretical and empirical research. Blockholders can exert governance through 
the threat of exit and voice, rather than only through actual exit and voice. So 
blockholders might apply governance regardless of whether threats are done or not. 
 
5.3 Limitation of the study  
 
 
Several main limitations are recognized in this study. Firstly, this study focuses on 
mixture of delisted and re-listed companies regardless of all sectors. All sectors that 
are listed in ACE and Main Market of Bursa Malaysia have been used for this 
research. There are a few other sectors that have been left out including consumer 
products, construction, mining, technology, plantations and properties. Thus, the 
results do not portray the other sectors in Malaysia. In order to get more satisfying 
and accurate results, a larger sample should be employed.  
 
The investigation only focused on Malaysian firms which would condescendingly 
suggest that the finding or data obtained from this examination only give practical 
knowledge for corporate management to see how precisely the corporate governance 
factors bring about the effects. Different nations other than Malaysia are urged to 
explore this issue keeping in mind the end goal to supply useful information for their 
separate fiscally upset organizations as various nations have their own arrangement, 
foundation and even culture. 
 
Furthermore, data gathering is crucial in this study as most of the corporate 
governance variables data are not available from some companies’ annual report. This 
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study identifies the firms’ data solely based on the firms’ annual report through the 
13 years period. This hand-collected information might provide inaccurate 
information and the data obtained from DataStream is also incomplete thus some 
firms need to be removed from the sample. 
 
5.4 Recommendation for future research 
 
 
This study provides a basis for future research on financial distress and corporate 
governance based on the Malaysian listed companies. Future research is needed to 
fully understand the determinant of firms’ financing. Recommendations for future 
research are: 
 
1. An exploration on larger sectors would provide more satisfying and accurate 
findings. 
2. Furthermore, this study also recommends future research to include other firm 
specifics variable such as tax in order to capture the benefits of debt financing. 
3. Since this study is limited in Malaysia only, further research can provide 
evidences from other countries in order to enhance the understandings on 
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APPENDICES: SPSS Results 
 
Logistic regression analysis 
 
MODEL 1 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 165 70.8 
Missing Cases 68 29.2 
Total 233 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 233 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 








Correct .0000 1.0000 
Step 0 
Outcomes 
.0000 103 0 100.0 
1.0000 62 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   62.4 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 







Variables not in the Equationa 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables 
TOTALASSETS 2.893 1 .089 
TOTALASSETTURNOVER 1.712 1 .191 
EBITTOTINTEXPENSERAT
IO 
.338 1 .561 
TOTALDEBTTOTALASSET
S 
.732 1 .392 
RETURNONASSETS 5.994 1 .014 
CURRENTRATIO .426 1 .514 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
 
Model Summary 




1 207.750a .063 .086 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 






Correct .0000 1.0000 
Step 1 
Outcomes 
.0000 95 8 92.2 
1.0000 51 11 17.7 
Overall Percentage   64.2 











Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a 
TOTALASSETS .000 .000 .752 1 .386 1.000 
TOTALASSETTURNOVER -.254 .238 1.139 1 .286 .776 
EBITTOTINTEXPENSERATIO -.004 .005 .586 1 .444 .996 
TOTALDEBTTOTALASSETS .000 .003 .003 1 .959 1.000 
RETURNONASSETS .018 .008 4.947 1 .026 1.018 
CURRENTRATIO -.076 .257 .087 1 .768 .927 
Constant -.184 .398 .214 1 .644 .832 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: TOTAL ASSETS, TOTAL ASSET TURNOVER, EBIT TO INT EXPENSE RATIO, 
TOTAL DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS, RETURN ON ASSETS, and CURRENT RATIO. 
 
MODEL 2 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 165 70.8 
Missing Cases 68 29.2 
Total 233 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 233 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
Dependent Variable Encoding 








Correct .0000 1.0000 
Step 0 
Outcomes 
.0000 103 0 100.0 
1.0000 62 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   62.4 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
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Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.508 .161 9.972 1 .002 .602 
 
 
Variables not in the Equationa 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables 
TOTALASSETS 2.893 1 .089 
TOTALASSETTURNOVER 1.712 1 .191 
EBITTOTINTEXPENSERATIO .338 1 .561 
TOTAL DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS .732 1 .392 
RETURN ON ASSETS 5.994 1 .014 
CURREN TRATIO .426 1 .514 
CAR11 6.446 1 .011 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
 
Model Summary 




1 202.182a .094 .128 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 






Correct .0000 1.0000 
Step 1 
Outcomes 
.0000 91 12 88.3 
1.0000 46 16 25.8 
Overall Percentage   64.8 










Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a 
TOTALASSETS .000 .000 .621 1 .431 1.000 
TOTAL ASSET TURNOVER -.232 .254 .832 1 .362 .793 
EBIT TO INT EXPENSE RATIO -.003 .005 .416 1 .519 .997 
TOTAL DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS -.001 .003 .094 1 .759 .999 
RETURN ON ASSETS .018 .008 4.582 1 .032 1.018 
CURRENT RATIO -.126 .262 .233 1 .629 .881 
CAR11 1.626 .722 5.076 1 .024 5.086 
Constant .328 .467 .494 1 .482 1.389 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: TOTAL ASSETS, TOTAL ASSET TURNOVER, EBIT TO INT EXPENSE RATIO, 




Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases 
Included in Analysis 142 60.9 
Missing Cases 91 39.1 
Total 233 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 233 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases. 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 









Correct .0000 1.0000 
Step 0 
Outcomes 
.0000 93 0 100.0 
1.0000 49 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   65.5 
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a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.641 .177 13.177 1 .000 .527 
 
Variables not in the Equationa 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables 
TOTALASSETS 2.344 1 .126 
TOTALASSETTURNOVER .448 1 .503 
EBIT TO INT EXPENSE RATIO .433 1 .511 
TOTAL DEBT TOTAL ASSETS (LEV) .306 1 .580 
RETURN ON ASSETS 6.364 1 .012 
CURRENTRATIO .963 1 .326 
CAR11 6.121 1 .013 
BOARD SIIZE .048 1 .827 
BLOCKHOLDERS OWNERSHIP 3.875 1 .049 
NUMBER OF BLOCKHOLDERS .046 1 .830 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
 
Model Summary 




1 154.307a .183 .253 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 Outcomes Percentage 
Correct  .0000 1.0000 
Step 1 
Outcomes 
.0000 84 9 90.3 
1.0000 28 21 42.9 
Overall Percentage   73.9 




Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
TOTALASSETS .000 .000 4.041 1 .044 1.000 
TOTALASSETTURNOVER .035 .304 .013 1 .908 1.036 
EBIT TO INT EXPENSE RATIO -.002 .004 .183 1 .669 .998 
TOTAL DEBT TOTAL ASSETS 
(LEV) 
.002 .004 .270 1 .603 1.002 
RETURNONASSETS .024 .011 5.125 1 .024 1.024 
CURRENTRATIO -.035 .294 .014 1 .904 .965 
CAR11 2.608 .954 7.474 1 .006 13.578 
BOARD SIZE .013 .131 .010 1 .920 1.013 
BLOCKHOLDERS OWNERSHIP 4.841 1.483 10.651 1 .001 126.635 
NUMBER OF BLOCKHOLDERS -.343 .135 6.473 1 .011 .710 
Constant -.934 1.040 .806 1 .369 .393 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: TOTAL ASSETS, TOTAL ASSET TURNOVER, EBIT TO INT EXPENSE RATIO, 
TOTAL DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS, RETURN ON ASSETS, CURRENT RATIO, CAR11, BOARD SIZE, 
BLOCKHOLDERS OWNERSHIP and NUMBER OF BLOCKHOLDERS. 
 





Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
CAR -1,+1 232 99.6% 1 0.4% 233 100.0% 
 TOTAL ASSETS 195 83.7% 38 16.3% 233 100.0% 
 TOTAL ASSET TURNOVER 195 83.7% 38 16.3% 233 100.0% 
EBIT TO  INT EXPENSE RATIO 193 82.8% 40 17.2% 233 100.0% 
TOTAL DEBT TO TOTAL ASSETS 194 83.3% 39 16.7% 233 100.0% 
RETURN ON ASSETS 177 76.0% 56 24.0% 233 100.0% 
CURRENT RATIO 186 79.8% 47 20.2% 233 100.0% 
BOARD SIZE 228 97.9% 5 2.1% 233 100.0% 
BLOCKHOLDERS OWNERSHIP 196 84.1% 37 15.9% 233 100.0% 









































1 .069 -.124 .024 .093 .058 .026 .029 -.117 .004 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .335 .084 .742 .199 .447 .727 .661 .104 .952 




.069 1 -.210** -.036 -.066 .179* .070 .098 -.023 .357** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .335  .003 .618 .359 .017 .339 .176 .767 .000 





-.124 -.210** 1 -.036 .107 -.027 -.006 -.029 -.032 -.073 
Sig. (2-tailed) .084 .003  .625 .138 .718 .940 .686 .681 .354 
N 195 195 195 192 194 177 186 193 164 165 




.024 -.036 -.036 1 -.051 .225** -.181* -.018 -.046 .011 
Sig. (2-tailed) .742 .618 .625  .488 .003 .014 .801 .562 .891 
N 193 192 192 193 191 174 183 191 162 163 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.093 -.066 .107 -.051 1 -.356** -.321** -.100 -.071 .046 
68 
 
TOTAL DEBT TO 
TOTAL ASSETS 
(LEVERAGE) 
Sig. (2-tailed) .199 .359 .138 .488  .000 .000 .168 .366 .556 





.058 .179* -.027 .225** -.356** 1 .192* .168* .074 .048 
Sig. (2-tailed) .447 .017 .718 .003 .000  .013 .026 .368 .555 




.026 .070 -.006 -.181* -.321** .192* 1 .059 .102 .034 
Sig. (2-tailed) .727 .339 .940 .014 .000 .013  .428 .200 .675 




.029 .098 -.029 -.018 -.100 .168* .059 1 .081 .050 
Sig. (2-tailed) .661 .176 .686 .801 .168 .026 .428  .263 .487 





-.117 -.023 -.032 -.046 -.071 .074 .102 .081 1 .451** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .104 .767 .681 .562 .366 .368 .200 .263  .000 





.004 .357** -.073 .011 .046 .048 .034 .050 .451** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .952 .000 .354 .891 .556 .555 .675 .487 .000  
N 197 165 165 163 164 151 159 196 196 197 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
